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Evolution of mammalian social structure
Ronald K CHESSER*, Derrick W. SUGG, 0. Eugene RHODES, Jr,
James M. NOVAK and Michael H. SMITH*

Chesser R. K., Sugg D. W., Rhodes 0. E., Jr, Novak J. M. and Smith M. H. Evolution
of mammalian social structure. [In: Ecological genetics in mammals. G. B. Hartl and
J. Markowski, eds]. Acta theriol. 38, Suppl. 2: 163 - 17 4.
Social groups may be viewed as collections of individuals exhibiting nonindependent behavior and organized in a cooperative manner. The evolutionary advantage of
social behavior to individuals must be measured in its relativity to other potential
behaviors, the scale of competitive interactions, and under a variety of environmental
and genetic constraints. A primary tenet of social evolution is that coancestry will
promote the genes of related individuals. High values of coancestry, however, do not
necessarily translate into evolutionary advantage unless the primary competitive
interactions occur among the groups. Coancestry is affected by the breeding tactics
within and rates of genetic exchange among social groups. Low rates of exchange
among groups, regardless of breeding tactics, may result in high values for intragroup
coancestry but may lead to inbreeding depression in progeny. Likewise, breeding
tactics such as polygyny, may not impart any long-lasting evolutionary advantage if
genetic exchange rates are high. The evolution of social organizations typified by
different breeding and migration strategies is evaluated to determine the conditions
necessary for various tactics to result in genetic contributions by individuals equal to
those of monogamous mating systems. The models show that breeding and dispersal
tactics have probably evolved in concert and predict that social groups which are
characterized by strong gene correlations are likely to exhibit relatively low group
advantage for progeny survival and breeding. There is little impetus for high gene
correlations to accrue in situations where group advantage is very high relative to
monogamous systems.
Savannah River Ecology Laboratory, P. 0. Drawer E, Aiken, South Carolina 29802,
USA
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Introduction

The concepts of inclusive fitness and altruism (Hamilton 1963, 1964a, b) have
lead evolutionary biologists to explore the genetic. consequences of social organization. Recently, studies have centered on the ultimate costs or benefits of
dispersal and breeding strategies as well as their effects on individual fitness
(Bengtsson 1978, Greenwood 1980, Shields 1982, Waser and Jones 1983, Liberg
and von Schantz 1986, Chesser and Ryman 1986, Clutton-Brock 1989). Breeding
* Present address: Department of Genetics and Institute of Ecology, University of Georgia, Athens,
Georgia 30602, USA
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and dispersal tactics are primary factors governing the accumulation of gene correlations within, and hence, the partitioning of genetic variance among groups
(Chesser 1991a, b). Tactics such as polygyny and sex-biased dispersal may alter
genotypic distributions from those expected for panmixia and thereby set the stage
for modifying behavioral interactions within and among groups.
Social behavior is defined by interactions among individuals and not by genetic
relatedness (cf Wilson 1975). Gene correlations, however, may be viewed as
precursors to the maintenance and evolution of social behaviors (Hamilton 1963,
1964a, b, Chesser and Ryman 1986). Evidence of this association is found in the
numerous empirical attempts to assess genetic relationships within socially structured populations (Selander 1970, Schwartz and Armitage 1980, Chesser 1983,
Foltz and Hoogland 1983, McCullough and Chesser 1987, Melnick 1987). Most
studies have considered dispersal, or the lack thereof, as the primary factor
influencing coancestry (Cockerham 1969, 1973) within groups (Bengtsson 1978,
Moore and Ali 1984, Chesser and Ryman 1986, Keane 1990). Hence, with a paucity
of dispersal, inbreeding was seen as the major contributor to gene correlations
within groups and much attention centered on the optimal dispersal rate relative
to the cost of inbreeding (Bengtsson 1978, Chesser and Ryman 1986).
Chesser (1991a, b) documented that considerable levels of gene correlations
(coancestry; Cockerham 1969, 1973) could accrue from polygyny and female
philopatry without invoking inbreeding. Coefficients of relationship within breeding groups (lineages in Chesser 1991a, b) between 33 and 40 percent could be
maintained even with random male dispersal. These results are particularly
relevant to studies of mammalian social evolution because approximately 65
percent of mammalian taxa exhibit some degree offemale philopatry and polygyny
(Greenwood 1980). The high incidence of these breeding and dispersal tactics
indicates that such behaviors may provide selective advantages compared to
random admixtures of breeding individuals. However, species vary in the degree
of philopatry and polygyny exhibited and many taxa have adopted different
breeding and dispersal tactics (Greenwood 1980).
If there are tactics by which species may achieve high genetic relationship
within groups without substantial inbreeding costs, relative to other groups, then
why have not all taxa evolved to optimize those characteristics? Obviously, there
are additional constraints on the individuals and populations, other than genetic
relationship, that govern the evolution of behaviors (Moore and Ali 1984). Natural
selection acts on the phenotypic expression of the individual, not the breeding
group or population. Some behaviors may not allow equitable genetic contributions
of all individuals (such as polygyny). In this paper we develop models that
determine the conditions necessary for the evolution of various breeding and
dispersal behaviors that result in the same individual genetic contributions to
progeny as those of monogamy and panmixia. These models do not preclude
advantages bestowed on successful individuals, but rather that there is no selective
advantage of panmictic mating because the expected genetic contribution by an
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individual is the same. The methods employed for development of the models
utilize similar parameters and variable definitions as those of Chesser (1991a, b).

Gene correlations and parameter definitions
We will investigate the influence of various breeding and dispersal tactics on
the gene correlations defined as follows: F - average correlation of genes within
individuals (inbreeding coefficient), 8mm - the average coancestry among progeny
of the same sex within breeding groups, 8mf - the average coancestry among
progeny of different sex within breeding groups, and 8 - average correlation of
genes between random progeny within breeding groups. The parameters necessary
to derive the appropriate variables are:
n - number of breeding females within breeding groups for a given generation,
s - number of breeding groups (social groups or subpopulations) within the
population,
dm and df' - dispersal rates for males and females, respectively,
¢ - probability that random females within a breeding group mate with the same
male.
Chesser (1991a) defined the parameter <P as
m

2
"
,L,b t -b.t

i= 1
~= - - - - -

(1)

n (n - 1)

where mis the number of breeding males per breeding group, and bi is the number
of females mated by the ith male. However, because
m

(2)
i

=1

with (\2 denoting the variance in numbers of females mated by males, the expression for <P becomes
m
+ b (b - 1)]
(3)
~ = -~n~(n - 1)

rai

The expressions above involve several assumptions including steady-state
population size, equal size of all breeding groups, and discrete, non-overlapping
generations.

Dispersal and breeding tactics
Chesser (1991a, b) concluded that dispersal and breeding tactics probably
coevolved. The impetus for particular breeding and dispersal tactics is to increase
the coancestry 11mong individuals within brPeding groups relative to the coancestry
among individuals from different breeding groups. Hence, altruistic behavior dis-
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played among individuals within groups enhances the transmittal of genes of group
members. Chesser (1991b) used asymptotic values for inbreeding (F), coancestry
among progeny of the same sex (8mml, and coancestry among progeny of different
sex (8mf), to determine the variables necessary for comparison of the resultant
gene correlations within breeding groups. Asymptotic values of inbreeding and
coancestry are necessary and sufficient because gene correlations among groups
(a in Chesser 199 la, b) represent genetic variation that is lost and is therefore
unavailable for natural selection as long the groups maintain their integrity. Thus,
the variables arc asymptotic relative to the amount of remaining genetic variation
(Chesser 199lb) or to the most distantly related genes (Cockerham 1973). The
asymptotic values were defined as

(4)

F= _

[1-(1-y)(dm+d[-dmdf)] [cj>(n-1)+2)]
Sn - [Sn - ~ (n - 1) - 2] (1 - (1-y) (dm + dt - dm df)]

(where y denotes 1/s) for the inbreeding coefficient, and
/\

(5)

(6)

emm"" 4

/\

+ 2<jl + 2 (1- .Y) [d m (1 - ¢) + d[ l
n-1/\

1

e mm+ 4n

0 m[=-n-.-

for coancestry among progeny of the same and different sex, respectively (expression 5 assumes that (n-1)/(ns-1) ~ 1/s, see Chesser 199lb). The average coancestry
among progeny within breeding groups is
/\

(7)

/\

/\

~ = [8 mm + e mf] (1 - F) +

F

2

Finally, the coefficient of relationship (Wright 1922) is
/\

(8)

28

r=-/\

l+F
which, in this instance, provides a measure of the proportion of genes shared
between random members of a breeding group. The value of r attains an equilibrium value for a given breeding and dispersal regime as do the F-statistics
(Chesser 199lb). Thus, the coefficient of relationship may be expressed as a
differential rate function

(9)

20
z (El -r L1 0)
z L1 0
r=--=·
--=-1+.P 1+P+AP
AF
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Table 1. Expressions for determining the expected asymptotic values of inbreeding (F), coancestry
within groups (Omrn - among same sex, 8rnf- among different sexes, 0 - mean value), and coefficient
of relationship (r) within groups for random mating and polygynous mating. Expressions arc given for
two different breeding and dispersal tactics. Definitions for parameters are provided in the text.
Random mating

Polygyny
Female philopatry - male dispersal

F=~~l_-_d~m~(_l-~y~)~~

y (n

F=

4n - (4n -1)[1-dm(l -y)]

+ 1)

8n-y (7n-1)

1

1

=5,

2n + 1

= Tz;:;--

Bmm = 0, Bmr= 4 n

Bmm

O=

8 = 4n + 2y + 1 - ny
3 (8n- 7ny+y)

2-dm(l-y)
2 [dm (4n-4ny +y-)+ 1]

r

dm (l-y)-2

=---~~~---

r =

2dm (l -2n -y + 2ny)- 2

4n

Bmm

+ 2y + - ny

3(4n-3ny+y)

Male philopatry - female dispersal
F=

1-dr(l -y)
4n - (4n -1)[1-dr(l-y)I

1

Omm = 0, Bmt= 4n

0=----,-..,....--2_-_d~;_(_l_-~y)~~2 [dr (4n - 4ny + y-1) + ll
r=

dt(l-y)-2
2dr(l-2n-y + 2ny)-2

F

=_

y (n + 1)
8n-y(7n-l)

8mm=-- 1
6+2 (1-y)
e - 2 (n + 1)-y
mf- 4n(4-y)
8

= (2 +y)(l + 2n -ny)
(4 - y)(Bn - ?ny

+ y)

r= (2+y)(2n+~
(4-y)(4n - 3ny +y)

which will maintain a constant value until all genetic variation is lost (Li e and
Li F become zero).
The resultant inbreeding, coancestries, and coefficients of relationship for
different breeding and dispersal scenarios arc presented in Table 1. Tactics of
female ph11opatry and male dispersal are presented for both randomly mating
(df = ¢ = O) and polygynous (df= O; dm =qi= 1) mating systems. Secondly, male
philopatry with female dispersal is depicted for random mating (dm = ¢ = O) and
polygyny (dm = O; df =cj> = 1). For each tactic, the rate of dispersal from the native
area that would be necessary to result in the same genetic correlation within
groups can be derived by setting the r for random mating equal to that for
polygyny, and solving for the dispersal rate (Chesser 1991b). For male dispersal
and female philopatry this solution is
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(10)

dm

=

2 (Sn - 1)
16n 2

+ Bn - 2 - y - ny (4n - 1)

If the number of breeding groups is large, then dm = lln (cf Chesser 1991b).
This relatively low dispersal rate will yield an asymptotic inbreeding coefficient
of almost 20%, which will equal the coancestry resultant from philopatry. For
female biased dispersal and male philopatry the dispersal rate that would produce
equal ultimate coancestry within groups is

d/

(11)

= _____ ~(12~ - 4ny +

16n (n + 1)- ny (12 - 5y

y -~ _____ _

+ 4ny) + 2y -

4

-.v2

which, if the number of groups is large, becomes
d __

(12)

6n-1 _

f- 4n (n + 1) - 1

Thus, the dispersal rate necessary to produce identical relationship within
breeding groups for random mating and philopatry is greater when females are
the dispersers rather than when males disperse (Fig. I).
Evolution would not likely favor modification of dispersal rate to increase the
gene correlations within breeding groups. Asymptotic inbreeding coefficients of
approximately 20% will probably result in decreased viability or fertility (Falconer
1981). Also, it is difficult to conceive how natural selection acting on individuals
could maintain a dispersal rate of Iln. Similar levels of gene correlations within
groups, however, can be achieved with female philopatry, polygyny, and random
male dispersal (Chesser 1991a). These traits may be relatively invariant within
a sex, and thus represent evolutionary tactics rather than population characteristics such as rates.
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Fig. 1. The dispersal rate, as a function of the number nf femal<'s pPr group, necessary to produce
identical coefficients of rPlationship within breeding groups for random mating and philopatry for

both males and female5.
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Individual fitness and the evolution of social groups
Tactics that result in high coancestry within breeding groups may not necessarily infer an advantage to individuals. Similarly, homogeneity of gene frequencies
within a population will not provide any advantage for altruistic behavior.
Therefore, the formation of groups, which provides a means to partition gene
frequencies within the population, provides an impetus for cooperative behavior.
If social groups are to be the foci for cooperation and altruism, then there must
be some advantage for individuals to be affiliated with the groups. In the following
procedures we will develop the conditions necessary for the equivalence of fitnesses
for individuals in either monogamous or polygamous mating systems in which
groups may or may not be present.
One major difference between monogamous and polygynous mating systems is
that the probability of mating for polygynous males may be considerably lower
than that for monogamy. For example, if there is but one breeding male for each
group of n females, the probability that a male will breed is lln; with monogamy,
however, the probability of a male mating may be near unity. With monogamy,
the coancestry of a breeder to his progeny is 1/4 and is 1/8 to his sibling's progeny.
Thus, in a monogamous mating system, the expected coancestry of an adult to
progeny 18
CD

CD

3CD

4

8

8

flM=-+-=~·

(13)

where w is the probability of survival of the progeny. In a monogamous mating
system there is no expected coancestry to other individuals outside of the direct
family. In polygynous mating systems, however, the genes of progeny produced
by different females within groups are expected to be correlated (by fl). The value
of e is dependent upon the value of ¢J (mean and variance of male mating success)
and the number of females per breeding group as is shown in equation (5). Using
p to reference the probability of a male mating and g as a scalar by which group
membership increases or decreases the probability of progeny survival (probability
of survival of progeny is gw ), the expected coancestry of an adult male to progeny
born within a polygynous mating group is
(14)

fl =€ffPW+ gpw 0 + gw 0 = gw [p(l + 2 0) + 2 fl]
p

4

2

2

4

By setting 8M = 8p we can determine the conditions at which the expected
gene contributions of a breeding male are equivalent regardless of the male
breeding tactic. These boundary conditions are
fl= 3 - 2pg
4g(l+p)

(15)
or (16)

3

g

= 2 [p

(1

+ 28 ) + 28]
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For adult females the coancestry to the progeny is
(17)

which yield the same boundary conditions for coancestry (equation 14). However,
the solution for group advantage is slightly different, giving

3

(18)

g females = 2 + 48 (l + p)

Equation 14 gives the coancestry within polygynous breeding groups that would
be necessary for adults to have the same gene contributions as they would have
if there was a monogamous mating system. A portion of the gene contributions
may be provided by their relatives because not all of the males breed. Figure 2
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Fig. 2. Three-dimensional surface diagram depicting the boundary conditions for coanccstry within
groups as a function of group advantage (g) and probability of mating (p) which yield the genetic
equivalence of monogamy and polygynous rnaling systems for individual adults.
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Fig. 3. 'I'hree-dimensional surfacte diagram depicting thl' boundary conditions for group advanbge (g)
as a

function of cuancestry within groups (6) and probability of mating (p) which yield
polygynous mating systems for individual adult males.
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depicts the surface of this genetic equivalence wherein the effects of monogamy
and polygyny are equal for individuals. Equations 15 and 17 give the group
advantage scalar as a function of the co ancestry within groups and the probability
of male mating (Fig. 3). Clearly, as the group advantage becomes large (g >> 1)
small values of coancestry within breeding groups are necessary to convey equivalence to a monogamous breeding system.
The variables for co ancestry (e) and probability of mating (p) are not necessarily
independent. Without inbreeding, the highest possible coancestry within groups
ranges from 0.167 (very large groups) to approximately 0.194 (small groups; Chesser
199la) in completely polygynous systems exhibiting female philopatry. However, in
such systems the probability of a particular male mating is 1/n. Thus, e"" 0.175 and
p = 0.20 appear to be reasonable values for many polygynous mammals, values
which require relatively low values for group advantage (g c= 2.4) to insure the same
genetic contributions for adult males as monogamy. Without female philopatry,
polygynous mating systems can produce coancestry values between 0.125 and 0.167
depending on the size of the groups. Using p = 0.2 as above, the required value of
group advantage would range between 2.5 and 3. However, because of the female
dispersal the groups would necessarily be re-formed each generation.

Discussion
The above models were designed to explore boundary conditions for particular
behaviors. As such, they provide the functional equivalence for different breedingand dispersal tactics in producing intragroup gene correlations and contributions
of adult individuals to the subsequent generation whether they actually breed or
not. The models define the conditions for which the tactics are equivalent in
producing a result; thus, they represent the lower bounds of the evolutionary
process. The values necessary to result in equality are therefore minimum values.
Dispersal tactics for mammalian populations have received considerable attention in ecology, evolution, sociobiology, and conservation biology. Although
dispersal strategies vary among sex and age categories (Lidicker 1975, Lidicker
and Caldwell 1982, Stenseth 1983), it is more common among male than female
mammals (Greenwood 1980, Clutton-Brock 1989). Hypotheses for causation of ageand sex-biased dispersal fall into two general models: (1) philopatry by both sexes
is preferred and subordinants arc forced to leave thei.r natal area or social group
because of resource competition (Dobson 1982, Moore and Ali 1984, Dobson and
Jones 1985, Waser 1985, Anderson 1989); (2) juveniles disperse voluntarily
to search for mates and avoid inbreeding with close relatives (Packer 1979,
Greenwood 1980, Chesser and Ryman 1986, Harvey and Ralls 1986, Clutton-Brock
1989). Because the cost of inbreeding in mammals may be higher for females than
males, females may evolve mechanisms to avoid mating with male relatives
(Chesser and Ryman 1986). Male-biased dispersal and female philopatry are
tactics which effectively avoid close inbreeding (Cockburn et al. 1985, Chesser
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1991a). However, if polygyny persists. only a relatively small fraction of males
may mate regardless of the cost of dispersal. For mammals such as the black-tailed
prairie dog (Hoogland 1982) breeding groups comprise a single breeding male and
5 - 8 breeding females. In such cases, the probability at birth of a male mating
is approximately lln. Other species exhibit polygamy wherein a male may breed
with several females, yet over the lifetime of the males the probability of mating
may be relatively high; thus, the variance in reproductive success of males is low;
these breeding tactics will result in relatively low coancestry values and probably
little group integrity.
Previous inequality models emphasizf;d the constraining costs of dinpersal and
inbreeding on the inclusive fitness of individuals (Bengtsson 1978, Chesser and
Ryman 1986). While these papers elucidate the limits to inbreeding and dispersal
strategies, they require that individuals have some means to accurately assess
the risks of inbreeding and dispersal as well as the relatedness of group members
(Chesser and Ryman 1986). The efficacy of such assessment as an evolutionary
tactic is complicated by the fact that the relatedness within groups may be
constantly changing. Concomitant evolution of particular breeding and dispersal
tactics may make assessment ofvicissitudinal conditions unnecessary because the
results are based on expectations of parameters that remain relatively constant.
Therefore, these behaviors become fixed tactics rather than varying strategics.
Breeding behaviors may have evolved to take advantage of particular dispersal
tactics (or vice versa). Polygyny will contribute little to group integrity for adults
unless it is accompanied by male-biased dispersal. Likewise, female pbilopatry
and male dispersal result in minimal values of group coancestry when monogamy
prevails. In all of the models presented it is assumed that all females breed.
Females may be readily accepted as mates whereas the competition among males
may be substantial (Glutton-Brock 1989).
Membership in social groups may bestow an advantage via predator avoidance,
rearing of progeny, and cooperative attainment of resources (e.g. prey). Interestingly, our models predict that social groups which are characterized by relatively
strong gene correlations af(~ likely to exhibit low to moderate group advantage
(Figs 2 and 3). If the scalar for group advantage is below 2, then only inbreeding
or groups comprised of full siblings may ensure an individual the same genetic
contribution to the next generation as that of monogamy. There is little impetus
for high gene correlations to accrue in situations where the group advantage is
very high (g >> 5) relative to monogamous systems. Such may be the case in large
herding mammals and predators which rely on cooperative hunting to capture
large, mobile prey, especially where the prey may be scarse or difficult to kill (e.g.
wolf packs in some environments).
Group advantage is not solely dependent on environmental factors, but may
also be a function of the gene correlations themselves. Competition among relatives
is 1 - r (Hamilton l964a, b, Chesser and Ryman 1986); thus, g, the scalar for
group advantage, may become g = g' + r, where g' is the scalar independent of
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genetic effects, solely by coancestry within breeding groups. In the instance where
male polygyny and female philopatry persist, g"" 2.4, and r"" 0.35, leaving about
2 to 2. 1 for the group advantage independent of gene correlations (g'). Clearly,
even for the most robust social organizations the advantages for group membership
must exceed those due to inclusive fitness.
The asymptotic nature of relationship and coancestry within socially structured
populations (Chesser 1991a, b) clearly indicates that genetic variance within groups
accrues at the expense of genetic variance among groups. The partitioning of genetic
variance likewise infers that the decrease in competition within groups may be
accompanied by a concomitant increase in competition among groups. Competition
is produced by a limited supply or availibility of resources and a primary objective
of social groups may be to partition and protect limiting resources, ultimately to
increase supply within at the expense of the among groups. Partitioning of any
resource (genetic, sustenance, nesting sites, etc.) infers variance of the resource
either over space or time. The logical senquence leads us to the conclusion that
maintenance ofrobust social organizations whose primary purpose is the attainment
of resources are dependent more upon the variance of resource distributions than
upon the mean value of the resources. It follows from our models that if the resource
variance is high relative to the mean, then group advantage may also be high, and
groups may be characterized by relatively low genetic relationship. Intermediate
values ofresource variance may facilitate high gene correlations within groups and
no variation may invoke little or no group advantage or coancestry within.
Obviously, there are numerous causes for the persistence of social groups. We
have focused on but a few and our account of the possible factors is in no way
complete. The solutions to the models herein do, however, present valuable insight
into boundary conditions that would lead to a variety of social systems and prediction
for the genetic characterization of social groups. The evolutionary consequences of
social organization must follmv from the fitnesses of individuals. We have shown
that there exists a functional equivalence of individual contributions in socially
organized systems wherein breeding success is highly variable relative to that of
homogeneous monogamous systems. Furthermore, this functional equivalance may
be attained by relatively invariant breeding and dispersal tactics.
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